Connections between moral and artistic value have pre-occupied philosophers, on and off, at least since Plato and Aristotle, but has really exercised Anglo-American aestheticians for the past 20 or so years. At the heart of this debate, are two main questions: the ethical criticism question—is such criticism legitimate?--and second, the “aesthetic education” question: do artworks in general have a morally educative function, and, if so, how so?

Exactly where Kant’s aesthetics and philosophy of art stands with respect to these questions is, as one would expect, highly complicated but ultimately pretty clear. A lot of scholarly work has been done on this topic (Cohen, 1982; Guyer 1996; Henrich 1992;  Zuckert, 2007, and others). Far less clear is what Schopenhauer’s aesthetics has to say about them. This is the focus of my talk.

Ultimately, like Kant, Schopenhauer makes no real trouble for the ethical criticism of art despite the fact that for both thinkers aesthetic experience is disinterested. On the question of aesthetic education, however, I shall argue that there is a striking difference between them. Probably the deepest aesthetic education in Kant’s system is afforded by the notion of beauty as a symbol of morality. Schopenhauer transforms this into a metonymic relationship between beauty and resignation. Morality is based in compassion (Mitleid), but, as I shall argue, resignation is actually beyond compassion in Schopenhauer’s system insofar as it is a state beyond all willing and suffering, including co-suffering.  It is thus an amoral state. Insofar as aesthetic experience gives us a taste of the amoral, Schopenhauer is one of the first philosophers to theorize a real separation of the moral and aesthetic realms.